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IN SUPPORT OF THE THAYER THEORY OF
PRESUMPTIONS
Charles V. Laughlin*
learned judge once said to a young lawyer, "If you are ever a
trial court judge, never give reasons for your decisions. Your
rulings will probably be right, but your reasons will likely be wrong."
That statement may aptly apply to judicial pronouncements relating
to the subject of presumptions. Decisions are largely free from criticism so far as concerns the results reached, but the reasoning processes
by which they are reached appear to be in hopeless confusion. It is
believed that a theory can be presented which will both reconcile these
confusions of judicial techniques and explain the general consistency
in the results of decided cases. In part II of this essay an effort is made
to do this. In the presentation and development the Thayer theory,
which has been criticized by much legal writing of late, is supported,
but with qualifying explanations believed important. First, it is believed desirable to limit the concept of the term "presumption."

A

I
The article on Evidence in Corpus Juris Secundum lists 113 socalled presumptions. In addition, cross-references are made to many
other special subjects, e.g., marriage, where additional presumptions
are discussed. In checking source material relative to various of the
presumptions referred to, it soon becomes evident that the word has
been so promiscuously used as to be devoid of much of its utility.1
The language of the law is permeated by "magic words," such as the
word res gestae,2 which are used as substitutes for exact analyses. The
word "presumption" is rapidly becoming such a word. It has been
used to indicate numerous and unrelated rules of substantive and
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University.-Ed.
1

Professors Morgan and Maguire enumerated four senses in which the term "presumption" is used: (1) as synonymous with permissible inference, (2) as establishing a
case sufficient to permit the trier of the fact to decide that the presumed fact exists, even
though no logical inference of the presumed fact may be made from the basic fact, (3) as
requiring the acceptance of the presumed fact until certain specified conditions are met, and
(4) as a conclusive presumption or rule of substantive law. MoRGAN AND MAcUIRll,
CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 73-75 (1951). A similar classification is
made by Professor Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the
Burden of Proof," 68 Umv. PA. L. REv. 307 at 310 (1920).
2 See 2 HoLMEs-PoLLOCK LE'.ITERS 284-285 (1941); Homes v. Newman, [1931] 2
Ch. 112 at 120.
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procedural law. In most instances its use could be entirely eliminated
without affecting the thought. Courts have too frequently behaved
like law students when pushed to solve a particular problem. Instead
of analyzing they glibly seize upon such and such a presumption. In
the following paragraphs some of the diverse senses in which the word
"presumption" has been used will be enumerated.

I. As indicating a general disposition of courts. The United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Ross3 quoted with approval
from Best on Evidence, section 300, in connection with an asserted
presumption of regularity of judicial acts, as follows:
"The true principle intended to be asserted by the rule seems
to be, that there is a general disposition in courts of justice to uphold judicial and other acts rather than to render them inoperative. . . ."

2. As an authoritative reasoning principle. All reasoning including legalistic reasoning, is grounded upon one or more assumptions.
According to Dean Pound these assumptions, or authoritative starting
points, are called "principles"4 of law, as distinguished from rules of
law, strictly speaking. Courts sometimes, in announcing such authoritative reasoning principles, call them "presumptions."5 An example
of this use of the term is found in Farmers' National Bank v. Jones. 6
Suit, in that case, was against the principal and sureties on a promissory
note. Gardner, who handled the case as cashier of the payee bank,
was one of the sureties. He was not served with process. The other
sureties defended upon the theory that a later note (for the amount
of the original p.ote less a payment) discharged the original note. In
holding against that contention the reviewing court, apparently determining the issues de novo, said:
"These are some of the things that have led us to this conclusion: It would have been a dishonest act on the part of Gardner for him to have surrendered the note upon which he and
others were surety and to have accepted in lieu thereof a note
without surety, and the legal presumption is that men act honestly. "
In effect, what the court did was to say that in reaching its conclusion
on the facts of the case it started with the assumption that men act
s 92 U.S. 281 at 284 (1875).
In the symposium MY PmLOSOPHY oF LAw 249 at 257 (1941).
This is discussed in THAYER, A PRELIM:INARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
CoMMoN LAw 335 (1898).
6 234 Ky. 591 at 594, 28 S.W. (2d) 787 (1930).
4
5

AT nm
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honestly. 7 Authoritative reasoning principles are frequently used in
connection with rulings on pleadings8 or on the admission of evidence. 0
The tendency to call a reasoning principle a presumption is particularly found in non-jury cases.10 The breakdown· of the issues of
a case is logically the same whether trial is by a court and jury, or by
a court without a jury. It was astutely observed, however, in the
early North Carolina case of Lee 11. Pearce11 that, practically, such is
not the case. The court in that case was called upon to apply a presumption of fraud arising from the dealings of a :fiduciary with the
subject matter of his trust. Such issues had been recently made triable
by jury. The court regarded precedents established when trials of that
type of case were by chancellors without juries as of little value because
of the tendency of courts, when deciding all the issues of a case, simply
to decide the case and not differentiate between questions of law and
questions of fact. The reasoning of the case bears out the proposition
that in non-jury cases what are called presumptions are in most in7 See also Sandlin v. Gragg, (10th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 114, cert. den. 318 U.S.
785, 63 S.Ct. 983 (1943); and Berretta v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 181
Tenn. 118, 178 S.W. (2d) 753 (1944). In the first of these cases a so-called presumption
of judicial regularity was explained in the head-note as follows: ''Where motion by judgment creditor's administrator was to revive appeals in name of administrator, federal court
would assume, absent contrary showing, that Oklahoma Supreme Court's order was in
accordance with motion and within limits of administrator's order of appointment." In the
second case the coverage of a policy of liability insurance depended upon whether assured's
vehicle was being driven, at the time of the accident, by her son who was under the legal
age. There was no evidence as to that fact at the time of the accident because all parties
were suffering from retrograde amnesia. The evidence did show that the son was driving
shortly before the accident. The court said that the presumption of continuance of an
existing state of affairs was really only a legitimate conclusion from the evidence.
s In Farley v. Davis, IO Wash. (2d) 62, 116 P. (2d) 263 (1941), the court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of pleadings, used the term "presumptions" to indicate things
it would assume in the absence of contrary averment. That case represented litigation
concerning the legitimacy of an executor's account. There had been no express allegation
that certain statutory requirements had been complied with. The court however said that
in the absence of contrary allegations it would be presumed that there had been adequate
compliance. The court here used a reasoning assumption to fix the burden of making
affirmative allegations. In a like situation the court used similar language in Curl v. Security Trust Co., 127 W.Va. 501, 33 S.E. (2d) 677 (1945). The presumption in Miller v.
Aldrich, 202 Mass. 109, 88 N.E. 441 (1909), that the law of a foreign jurisdiction is the
same as that of the forum, is a judicial reasoning principle.
9 In a suit upon a fire insurance policy, the issue being whether the loss had been
total, the court in Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Nebraska Storage Warehouses,
(8th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 30, considered whether there was a presumption as to the
pre-existence of a present condition in ruling upon the relevancy of an offer of evidence as
to the condition of the premises sometime after the :fire.
10 Attention has been directed to issues presented on the pleadings and the admissibility of evidence, which are, of course, issues decided by a court and not a jury. What is
more particularly contemplated at this point are ultimate trials in which the entire case is
decided by a court without a jury, as in chancery cases or law cases in which trial by jury
has been waived.
1168 N.C. 76 (page 63 in some editions) (1872).
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stances reasoning principles.12 By actual count of a number of cases
in which the word "presumption" is used it was found that well over
half were non-jury cases.13 The use of the term "presumption" as a
reasoning principle in a non-jury case is somewhat analogous to the
use of that term as a "permissible inference"14 in a jury case; but the
two are not exactly the same. When a court finds that an inference
exists, it merely holds that the trier of the fact, i.e., the jury, may hold
that the inferred fact does exist. That is not the same as a court,
sitting without a jury, finding that the fact does actually exist. Neither
is the term "presumption" when used as synonymous with an argument
or reasoning principle exactly the same as a proposition of judicial
notice.15 The court does not, as in a case of judicial notice, hold that
a proposition of fact must be true; it merely concludes that it is true.
Such a reasoning principal. is not entitled to any particular weight.
In Stone v. Stone16 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the trial court for holding that the result of its decision was
determined by the presumption of official regularity.17
3. As a rule of substantive law. That the so-called "conclusive"
or "irrebuttable presumptions" are really not different from rules of
substantive law is well lmown and recognized by innumerable judicial
decisions.18 Such "presumptions" serve the same general purpose in
12 The court also makes an elaborate classification of presumptions that has little value
for our purposes.
13 In reading cases dealing with the term "presumption'' I was struck by the great
frequency of non-jury cases. At first the constant recurrence of non-jury cases made only
slight impression on me, but as my research continued the impact became increasingly
stronger, until I finally decided to keep score. That was toward the end of my case reading,
but among the cases tallied I counted 18 non-jury to 14 jury.
14 Discussed infra p. 204.
15 Discussed infra p. 205.
16 (D.C. Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 761.
17 Suit was for nullification of a marriage contracted in Virginia upon the ground that
the defendant husband was affiicted with syphilis. In order to be entitled to the relief
requested it was necessary for plaintiff to prove that she was ignorant of the defendant's
condition at the time of their marriage. Virginia law required the usual blood tests prior
to the issuance of a marriage license, and it also required that if either blood test show the
existence of the disease, the other party must be so informed by the medical examiner. It
did not forbid the issuance of the license or the marriage. Plaintiff testified that the medical
examiner merely told her that there was "no reason why she should not marry." The trial
court, however, denied the divorce because of his belief that the issue was controlled by
the presumption that the medical examiner had done his official duty. In reversing, the
reviewing court held that said "presumption" was a mere argument to be considered in
deciding the issue.
1s Messmore v. Madison Glue Mfg. Co., 82 Ind. App. 184, 145 N.E. 556 (1924)
(compensation act specifying certain persons as conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent); Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 197 Iowa 1367, 199 N.W. 410 (1924) (rule of law that
knowledge of an attorney is chargeable to his client is sometimes expressed as a conclusive
presumption that the attorney has communicated the facts to his client); United Life 8c
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our law as :fictions. By expressing what are in reality rules of law in
the form of rules of evidence, the courts have a method by which the
law can change its content without ostensibly announcing new rules.
As in the case of rules of substantive law, rules of procedural law
are frequently called presumptions, although they are not conclusive.
The next three uses of the term "presumption" fall into that category.

4. As a rule fixing the burden of persuasion. A presumption
which operates against the party who does not have the burden of
persuasion would seem to be redundant, or, as Justice Lummus says,
"Like a handkerchief thrown over something covered by a blanket."19
Actually, it would seem, the rule announcing such a "presumption"
is really another way of indicating the party upon whom the burden
of persuasion is placed. A striking example of this situation is in
connection with the "presumption of innocence." Courts have had
great trouble in determining whether said presumption may be the
subject matter of an instruction to the jury. Such difficulty should
disappear if it were only realized that said presumption is another way
of saying that the burden is upon the prosecution to persuade the jury
of the guilt of the defendant. Fortunately, courts have recognized
that presumptions of this variety are rules locating the burden of persuasion.20 In Yeary 11. Holhrook21 the court recognized that what was
called a "presumption against negligence" indicates merely that the
burden of proving negligence is on the plaintiff. Sheldon 11. Wright2 2
was a malpractice case against a doctor. It was held that an instruction
to the effect that there is a "presumption against malpractice" was
Accident Ins. Co. v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 182 A. 421 (1936) (inability to recover on an
accident policy for a death feloneously infficted is sometimes expressed by saying that the
intention to inffict death is conclusively presumed); United States v. Jones, (9th Cir. 1949)
176 F. (2d) 278 (where, in a case under the Surplus Property Disposal Act the court said
at p. 288: " .•• But where, as here, the Government deals with its own property, and
declares certain memorials of official acts to be 'conclusive evidence of compliance with the
Act' there is evidenced the intent to insure the title of the purchaser for value . . . against
any absence of authority preceding the execution of the memorials ..."); Kellogg v. Murphy,
349 Mo. 1165, 164 S.W. (2d) 285 (1942) (dicta); Puget Sound Electric Ry. v. Benson,
(9th Cir. 1918) 253 F. 710 (legislative enactment declaring that the operation of a streetcar in excess of the speed limit creates a conclusive presumption of negligence was construed as a negligence per se statute); Peterson v. Wahlquist, 125 Neb. 247, 249 N.W.
678 (1933) (in creditor's bill to set aside fraudulent conveyances, it was held that where
a debtor knowingly conveyed all his property without consideration he could not be heard
to say that he did not intend to defraud because ''he is conclusively presumed to intend
the obvious and probable consequences of his voluntary acts").
19Concurring in Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192 at 196, 189 N.E. 41 (1934).
20 Usually called the ''burden of proof."
21171 Va. 266, 198 S.E. 441 (1938).
22 80 Vt. 298, 67 A. 807 (1907).
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properly refused. The opinion recognized that some courts had used
such language but characterized it as "unguarded and inexact" and
pointed out that it meant no more than that the plaintiff had the burden
of proving the doctor's negligence. And it was held in Bailey v. City
of Ravenna2 3 that the presumption of regularity of the passage of a
municipal ordinance really means that the burden of persuasion is on
the party asserting invalidity.24
A view has been taken by some25 that the proper effect of a presumption should be to shift the burden of persuasion. 26 That theory
is more specifically discussed in the second section of this article. For
present purposes it may be observed that such a view might appear to
place all presumptions within the fourth category, here discussed.
Such, however, is not the case. The reference here is not to rules
shifting the burden of persuasion, but to rules locating said burden.
Of course, any rule which- shifts s_aid burden locates it, at least for the
time being. Much can be said for the proposition that the burden of
persuasion never shifts. In most cases an inspection of the pleadings
should show which party has the burden of persuasion. Of course,
it is a mistake to speak of the burden of persuasion as if there were
only one such burden in an entire law suit. There is a separate burden
of persuasion for each operative fact. The operative facts material
23 280 Ky. 21, 132 S.W. (2d) 532 (1939).
24 The rationale of other cases would be clearer

if the court had recognized the reasoning in the cases cited. Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P. (2d) 649 (1935), was a
suit by one spouse against the parents of the other for alienation of affections. The court's
difficulty with the question of instructing upon the presumption of good faith would have
been avoided if it had been realized that said presumption was another way of placing the
burden of persuasion as to good faith upon the plaintiff. In Brazill v. Green, 243 Mass.
252, 137 N.E. 346 (1922), the court announced that "where a return on a writ is made
by one who purports to act as an officer qualified to serve process, it is presumed that the
signer is an incumbent of the office until the contrary is proved." This is really another
way of saying that the burden of persuasion is upon the party attacking the jurisdiction of
the court over his person. The same may be said regarding the presumption of a plaintiff's
legal capacity to sue recognized in Harrington v. Central State Fire Ins. Co., 169 Okla.
255, 36 P. (2d) 738 (1934). Upon a plea in abatement the burden of persuasion would
be upon the defendant. The presumption that a judgment or decree appealed from is
correct, referred to in Dent v. Foy, 214 Ala. 243, 107 S. 210 (1925), means no more than
that the appellant must convince a reviewing court that a decision is wrong before he can
expect a reversal.
25 With considerable modern following in professorial circles.
26 This is the so-called "Pennsylvania view" which is supported by the older cases of
that jurisdiction. Grenet's Estate, 332 Pa. 111 at 113, 2 A. (2d) 707 (1938); Holzheimer
v. Lit Brothers, 262 Pa. 150, 105 · A. 73 (1918). That view is also supported by many
professors and law review writers. See Morgan, "Further Observations on Presumptions,"
16 So. CAL. L. REv. 245 (1943); Morgan, ''Presumptions," 12 WASH. L. REv. 255
(1937); Helman, ''Presumptions," 22 CAN. B. REv. 118 (1944). Recent Pennsylvania
cases seem to have abandoned that view. See MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 348 Pa.
558 at 567, 36 A. (2d) 492 (1944); Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 188 A. 350 (1936);
Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934).
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in a particular case may be called "if" facts and "unless" facts. 27 For
example: If the defendant was guilty of negligence and if said negligence proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may
recover damages unless he was guilty of contributory negligence, or
unless the plaintiff validly released the defendant. 28 It seems selfevident that the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion upon all facts
introduced by "if," whereas said burden is on the defendant as to all
facts introduced by "unless." Except where pleading is complicated
by the use of general issue pleas, as in criminal cases, the "if" factual
issues should be capable of being differentiated from the "unless" issues
by an inspection of the pleadings.29 The same legal policy which
determines the location of the burden of persuasion30 should, and
normally will, determine the burden of making allegations. When
it is said that the burden of persuasion shifts, what is really meant is
that alternative propositions regarding the issues of a case may arise
from the pleadings. Consider the most frequently cited instance of
the shifting of the burden of persuasion, the presumption of legitimacy.
The issues in such a case might be stated as follows: If Sis the legitimate son of F, now deceased, he is entitled to share in F's estate, or if
S is the son of a woman who was married to F at the time of the birth
of S, he is entitled to share in the estate of F unless F was not the father
of S. Properly pleaded, S would not allege the paternity of F, but
would allege the maternity of F's wife. Thus the burden of persuasion
has not been shifted but is the same throughout the case, and its location is susceptible of being determined by the pleadings.
The location of the burden of persuasion as to any particular issue
is eventually determined by policy considerations of the same type as
determine the rules of substantive law.31 For instance, in an action
for defamation the plaintiff need not prove falsity, but if truth of the
scandalous publication is a defense at all it must be affirmatively estab27 Compare Michael and Adler, "The Trial of an Issue of Fact,'' 34 CoL. L. REv.
1224 at 1241 and 1242 (1934).
28 This example is obviously over-simplified. In an actual case the operative facts in
issue would normally be far more numerous.
29 Compare 9 WmMoRll, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2485 (1940).
30 The position is taken infra that the location of the burden of persuasion is determined
by the same policy considerations as determine substantive rules of law.
31 Compare 9 WIGMORll, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2484, 2485, 2488 (1940), and Morgan,
Foreword to the Model Code, p. 58. Under a modern system requiring completely responsive pleadings, policy considerations will mediately determine the burden of persuasions via
pleading rules requiring allegations. See Sco'IT AND SIMPSON, CAsEs AND Onnm MATE.RIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 468, editorial statement (1950). Under any single pleading
situation, as for instance where general issue pleas are allowed, policy considerations will
immediately determine the location of the burden of persuasion.
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lished. Falsity could have been made an element of the plaintiff's case.
But there is no strong social policy favorable to the claims of a man
who desires to publish derogatory truth. The law could have made
truth irrelevant. 32 However, that seems a bit too favorable to a plaintiff.
The compromise position is to make it relevant, but to impose the
burden of persuasion on the defendant. The importance of considerations of justice (i.e., policy considerations) in determining the
location of the burden of persuasion is shown by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Morrison v. California. 33
That case arose under the Alien Land Law of California. It was held
that a statutory provision imposing upon the defendant the burden of
proving that he was not an alien ineligible for citizenship violated the
due process clause. The following passage from the opinion of Justice
Cardozo is pertinent:
"The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason
and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in
criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in
substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make
it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been
proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the
shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser
without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression."

It is not contended that a due process problem is presented in the usual
civil case. The use of the Morrison case is by way of analogy. The
considerations of fairness and policy which may invoke the due process
clause in a criminal case underlie the location of the burden of persuasion in any case.34
82 A result which
33 291 U.S. 82 at

has been partially accomplished by statute in some states.
88, 54 S.Ct. 281 (1934).
34 Compare Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298, 67 A. 807 (1907), discussed supra note
22. The court there held that a presumption against malpractice was really a rule locating
the burden of persuasion. The court recognized strong policy considerations in favor of
giving a medical practitioner the optimum of protection. It was implicit in the opinion that
said policy considerations could be disposed of by the rule placing the burden of persuasion
on plaintiff.
A novel problem in relation to the burden of persuasion is presented in Reliance Life
Ins. Co. v. Burgess, (8th. Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 234, cert. den. 311 U.S. 699, 61 S.Ct.
391 (1940). The plaintiff insurance company sued for a declaratory judgment to determine
its liability for the death of an assured covered by a policy insuring against accidental death.
Plaintiff's theory was that the death resulted from suicide and not from accident. One of
the principal questions considered was the location of the burden of persuasion on the
question of suicide. It was implicit in the opinion that if the beneficiary had sued on the
policy he would have had the burden of persuasion on that issue. The majority of the
court, however, held that because of the fact that the insurance company, as plaintiff, was
required to allege suicide, it had the burden of persuasion. Judge Sanborn argued that the
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The location of the burden of persuasion should not be confused
with the ability to persuade, or with what is required to sustain said
burden. The suggestion was made by Justice Cardozo in the passage
quoted above that the greater ability of a party to produce evidence
might be a factor in placing the burden of persuasion. Dean Wigmore
makes the same suggestion.35 It would seem that the relative ability
of two parties to produce evidence relates more to the obligation to
produce it than it does to the burden of persuasion. That such is the
case may more clearly appear when the other possible confusion is
considered.
Jeremy Bentham argued that the burden of persuasion should be
upon the defendant to disprove the elements of the plaintiff's case,
or upon a criminal defendant to establish his innocence, rather than
upon a plaintiff to prove the elements of his case or upon the prosecution to prove the criminal defendant guilty.36 Bentham's reasoning
is that the balance of probability is in favor of the plaintiff or prosecution because civil or criminal actions are not usually instituted unless
the probabilities are in favor of the instigator. Bentham's fallacy consists in confusing the location of the burden of persuasion with the
necessary requirements for meeting said burden. The weight of probability is all important in determining whether a persuasion has been
accomplished, but the question of who has the burden should be determined by the policy considerations which underlie our jurisprudence.
It is probably true that most persons indicted of criminal offenses are
guilty. The thorough screening given to such cases by committing
magistrates, prosecuting attorneys and grand juries would seem to
assure a probability of guilt in all cases coming to trial. But if a man
could be indicted and thereby have the burden of proving his innocence
cast upon him, the law could easily become an instrument for persecution which would be contrary to sound social policy.
location of that burden should not depend upon the accidents of pleading, but upon the
general policy underlying the law, and he could see no reason why that burden should be
changed by the fact that the company sued for a declaratory judgment. Judge Sanborn's
position seems sound. To be sure, the burden of persuasion should correspond to the
burden of making affirmative allegations. The plaintiff company should be able to allege
a cause of action for declaratory relief by alleging the existence of justiciable issues, placing
upon the defendant beneficiary the burden of alleging death by accidental means, thereby
negativing suicide.
EvmBNCil, 3d ed., §2486 (1940).
I have no source reference. The authority for my statement regarding Bentham's
view is a reference thereto in an article entitled "Presumptions of Law and Presumptive
Evidence," published in the (English) LAw MA.GAZINB, VI, 348, October, 1831, and
reprinted by Professor Thayer in his PRELIMINARY TREAnsB ON EvmBNCil, Appendix A,
539 at 544 (1898).
35 WmMoRE,
36
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5. As a permissible inference. Courts are frequently called to
pass upon the permissibility of inferences to be made, by someone else,
from circumstantial evidence. Such action is usually required when
a court passes upon the question of whether a verdict is, or can be,
supported by the evidence. 37 Standardized situations in which courts
have held that assumptions by a trier of the fact are warranted, but not
required, have been called permissible inferences, and have also frequently been called presumptions. 38 Thus, in People 17. Swiggy,39 the
court, in upholding a jury's determination upon an issue of paternity,
judicially noticed the usual period of gestation and then presumed that
birth occurred according to the usual course of nature. Although the
word "presumed" was used, it was evident that the court meant that
the jury was entitled to infer that the defendant was the father of the
child whose paternity was in question. A refusal to regard an inference
of this type as a presumption was recently made by Justice Lummus in
Moroni 17. Brawders.40 The issue in that case was whether a merger
between two labor unions had been legally accomplished. A dissenting
faction in one of the unions contended that it had not because the
constitution of that union required an affirmative two-thirds vote of the
entire membership before it could merge with another union. There
was no immediate evidence that the two-thirds vote had been obtained,
but it was argued that a presumption of regularity existed. The court
pointed out that no problem of presumption existed, but that the trial
court was permitted to infer that the merged union had been legally
established because it had functioned for several years without prior
challenge.41 It should be reiterated that a presumption, used as synonymous with a permissible inference, is not exactly .the same as a
presumption used as synonymous with a reasoning principle. Courts
usually declare permissible inferences to exist in cases in which other
37 For example, upon a motion for a directed verdict, new trial, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or upon an issue presented to a reviewing court as to whether the
judgment of a trial court, entered upon a jury's verdict or a court's finding, can stand or
must be reversed because not supported by evidence.
38 This is the sense in which the term "presumption" is used in the MANaAL POR
CotmTs-M.ARTIAL, Umnm STATES, 1951, §138.
39 69 Cal. App. 574, 232 P. 174 (1924) (hearing denied by Supreme Court of
California).
40 317 Mass. 48, 57 N.E. (2d) 14 (1944).
41 For a slightly earlier Massachusetts case, in which the headnote editor calls a presumption what the court regarded as a permissible inference, see Conroy v. Fall River
Herald News Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 488, 28 N.E. (2d) 729 (1940). The court in Wellisch
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293 N.Y. 178, 56 N.E. (2d) 540 (1944), recognized
that the presumption against suicide in a suit on an ordinary life insurance policy is different from other types of presumptions and is really a "judicial recognition of what is
probable."
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judicial bodies 6.nd the facts, whereas, when a court itself determines
the facts, it does more than 6.nd that a particular inference may legitimately be made; it actually makes the inference.
6. As a statutory prima facie case. This use of the term presumption is somewhat similar to that previously mentioned, and yet
differs in that here there is no judicially recognized permissible inference. The legislature has, nonetheless, declared that proof of certain
facts shall be sufficient to constitute prima facie evidence, i.e., evidence
sufficient to authorize submission of the issue as to the existence of an
operative fact to the jury.42 Sometimes such a statutory prima facie
case is called a presumption;43 other times the statutes merely provide
that proof of certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts made operative. Except for possible constitutional objections,44
a legislature, having power to define the elements of a cause of action,
would have power to prescribe the proof necessary to submit particular
cases to the jury. No useful purpose is gained, however, by calling
such a statutory prima facie case a presumption.
7. As a proposition of judicial notice. Courts have sometimes
likened particular presumptions to propositions of judicial notice. 411
Such a comparison is true only in the sense that the court judicially
notices the usual course of human experience and then uses the proposition so judicially noticed as either the basis for a reasoning principle
or the basis for a permissible inference.
8. As a rule shi~ing the burden of producing evidence. The party
upon whom the burden of persuasion as to any operative fact is imposed
will also have the burden of producing evidence upon that issue. If
he fails to produce evidence from which the existence of said operative
fact may be inferred, the court will direct a verdict or otherwise hold
as a matter of law against him. It is unfortunate that the term "in42Wigmore points out [EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2494 (1940)] that the term "prima facie
evidence" is used in two senses, (1) as sufficient evidence to authorize a directed verdict
unless rebutted; (2) as sufficient evidence to authorize submission of an issue of fact to
the jury. When used in connection with statutory prima facie evidence it is normally used
in the second sense.
43 Morgan, "Further Observations on Presumptions," 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 245 at
246 (1943); AMERICAN LAw INsTITaTE, MoDBL CoDB 307 (1942).
44 Compare Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943); Western &
Atl. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445 (1929); Mobile, J. & K.C. R. v.
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136 (1910); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 54
S.Ct. 281 (1934).
45 Indication to that effect is found in Allen v. Merchants Fire Assur. Corp., 179 Wash.
189, 36 P. (2d) 545 (1934); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Heitchew, (5th Cir. 1944) 146
F. (2d) 71, cert. den. 324 U.S. 865, 65 S.Ct. 914 (1945); and People v. Swiggy, 69
Cal. App. 574, 232 P. 174 (1924) (hearing denied by Supreme Court of California).

206

MicHIGAN

LAw R:svmw

[ Vol. 52

ference" has come to be limited to inferences from circumstantial evidence. Even in the case of testimonial evidence tending to sustain an
operative fact, it is necessary to infer that fact. The witness' perception
or memory may be faulty, we may not correctly understand him, or
he may not be truthful. 46
The burden of producing evidence may be shifted from one party
to the other. In this way, it is possible that the two burdens may be
separated, i.e., the burden of producing evidence may be upon one
party, whereas the burden of persuasion is upon his opponent. A rule
bringing about this shifting of the burden of producing evidence is
called a presumption. We may call the party who has the burden of
persuasion the proponent, and his opposite party the opponent.47 The
effect of a presumption, as thus used, is to impose upon the opponent
the alternative of producing evidence against the operative fact in issue
or of having a verdict directed against him upon that issue. The operation of such a presumption is illustrated by the case of Basham 11. Prudential Insurance Company of America.48 Suit was upon a policy
insuring against accidental death. Insured met his death by falling
from a window. There was no evidence to indicate how or why he fell.
It was incumbent upon plaintiff to persuade the jury that the death
was the result of accident and not suicide. However, the plaintiff was
aided by a presumption against suicide. There being no actual evidence
of suicide, it was held that the court properly instructed the jury, in
effect, that they must accept the death as accidental.
How does such a presumption come into existence? Two general
types of explanations may be made. It may be that the proponent has
produced a case of such strong persuasive force that a decision in his
favor will be clearly indicated unless rebutting evidence is introduced.
On the other hand, even though the proponent has not been able to
produce a case of such persuasive force as clearly to entitle him to
recover, there may be some paramount legal policy requiring the opponent to "show his hand."49
The first of the two bases for presumptions of this type can be
understood by realizing that the problem of proof involves the determining of relative probabilities. 60 The determination of an operative
46 See MonGAN AND MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EvroENCll, 3d ed., 501
(1951). It might further be observed that inference would normally be necessary, even in
the case of real evidence. The testimony of witnesses is necessary to qualify such evidence.
47 As to most issues the plaintiff will be proponent and the defendant opponent, but,
of course, that will not always be true.
48 232 Mo. App. 782, 113 S.W. (2d) 126 (1938).
49 See Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934).
60 Michael and Adler, "The Trial of an Issue of Fact," 34 CoL. L. REv. 1224, 1462
(1934). The thought that proof is dependent upon probability runs completely through
this long and learned article. Special reference may be made to pages 1239 and 1257.
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fact in issue must depend upon whether, given the same evidence, the
experience of mankind would indicate that said fact is more probably
true than not. Such probabilities as are involved in law suits are not
determinable with exactitude. Judgment is involved. The court may
believe that reasonable minds cannot differ as to where the weight of
probability is to be found. If so, the court decides the issue. If, however, reasonable minds can differ, the question is one for the trier of
the fact, i.e., the jury, if there is one. If the evidence in favor of the
proponent is so weak that, upon the basis thereof, reasonable minds
must agree that the operative fact contended for is probably not true,
the proponent has failed to prove a case and will suffer a directed verdict
against him. If, however, his evidence is sufficiently strong that
reasonable minds may at least differ, he has the benefit of an inference51
and is entitled to have his case submitted to the trier of the fact. A
third situation exists in which the proponent has introduced evidence
so persuasive that, if it is not rebutted, reasonable minds must agree
that the fact contended for is probably true. If the proof for the proponent arises to such dignity, he will be entitled to a directed verdict,
unless evidence is introduced by the opponent. Thus, the burden
of introducing evidence has been shifted, and a presumption, in the
sense in which the term is now used, exists.
It is unfortunate that the term presumption, indicating a case so
strong as to require rebutting evidence, has been conventionally limited
to a case predicated upon circumstantial evidence. Therefore, in conventional usage a basic fact is usually required before a presumption
comes into existence. It is doubtful that the natural meaning of the
word "presumption" requires such a limitation. It would seem to have
the same significance as in the expression "heir presumptive," i.e.,.
one who is entitled to inherit unless someone with a superior right
comes into existence. The term "prima facie case" is ambiguous.52
It may mean (1) sufficient evidence to authorize a directed verdict if
rebutting evidence is not introduced, or (2) sufficient evidence to
authorize submission of a case to the jury. In lieu of the term "prima
facie case" the following terms could well be used: (1) "presumptive
case," to indicate the first of the above meanings, and (2) "inferential
case," to indicate the second of the above meanings.53 However, the
purpose of this article is not to quibble with conventional terminology.
We may therefore regard a presumption as predicated upon circumstantial evidence.
51 That is, the trier of the fact could decide in his favor.
52 9 WIGMORE, EvmBNCE, 3d ed., §2494 (1940).
53 It has been pointed out supra that an inference is necessary

to permit a case to be
submitted to the trier of the fact, even where evidence is in no way circumstantial.
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It is noted above that the burden of producing evidence may be
shifted to the opponent even though the proponent's evidence is not
so strong as to require a verdict in his favor. Such a result can be
accomplished only by some kind of policy consideration. A discussion
of that subject will not be embarked upon at this point because it is
fully considered in Part II of this article.
We have seen in the preceding paragraphs at least eight conceptions
of the word "presumption." The term is so vague and ambiguous that
a more thorough research might uncover other senses in which it has
been used. 54 It should be noted that different meanings may be
ascribed to the very same presumption depending upon how the problem arises in a particular instance of litigation. Consider, for example,
the presumption against suicide. Such a presumption may become
pertinent in either one of two ways: (I) The beneficiary may be suing
upon an ordinary policy of life insurance, and the defendant may
assert a defense of suicide; (2) the beneficiary may be suing upon a
policy covering death by accidental means. In the first situation the
burden of persuasion is on the defendant insurance company to prove
suicide. Thus a presumption against suicide is no more than a restatement of that burden, and we see the fourth conception of the
term being used, as enumerated above. In the second instance the
burden of persuasion is upon the plaintiff beneficiary to prove death
by accidental means, which involves refuting suicide. However, he is
aided by the presumption against suicide, or the corresponding presumption that any violent death is accidental. Thus, before an issue
as to suicide can be submitted to the trier of the fact the defendant
insurer must introduce evidence from which a conclusion of suicide
can be inferred. Thus we see a presumption in the eighth sense above
enumerated, i.e., as a procedural device shifting the burden of producing evidence. Here the two burdens are separated. The plaintiff
has the burden of persuasion if the issue ever goes to the trier of the
fact; the defendant has the burden of producing evidence before the
issue can be submitted to the jury.
As indicated at the outset of this article, the uses of the term "presumption" are so numerous and varied as to deprive that term of much
usefulness. It is difficult to see any common meaning among all the
conceptions of the term. It cannot be said that in all instances in
5 4 No attempt has been made to differentiate between presumptions of fact and
presumptions of law. The differentiation itself is ambiguous. Under some differentiations
a presumption of fact is regarded as simply a permissible inference (sense number five
above), whereas a presumption of law is regarded as a procedural device shifting the burden
of producing evidence (sense number eight above). Under other classifications a procedural device shifting the burden of producing evidence is called a presumption of fact,
whereas all other uses of the term "presumption" are regarded as presumptions of law.
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which the word is used the proof of one fact, a basic fact, requires the
assumption of another fact. Some presumptions may exist without
the establishment of any particular basic fact, for example, the presumptions of sanity and of innocence.
Not only is this common meaning absent, but there are numerous
cases which, without using the word "presumption," establish rules
not differing in principle from those which do use the word "presumption" in the first seven of its meanings discussed above. Thus, it is
rare that a general disposition of courts is called a presumption. As
pointed out above, some authoritative reasoning principles may be
called "presumptions," but usually they are regarded merely as principles of law. Likewise, only a small minority of all the rules of law
are expressed as conclusive presumptions. There is no need whatever
for calling a rule locating the burden of persuasion a presumption.
There are many such rules that are not so called. We know that the
burden is upon a defendant alleging truth in a defamation case to
prove his allegation. Yet we do not say that "all derogatory statements
are presumed to be false." Such a statement, however, would make
as much sense as to say that a criminal defendant is presumed to be
innocent merely because the burden of persuasion is on the prosecution
to prove him guilty. There is no objection to calling a permissible
inference a presumption, except the fact that we already have a good,
unambiguous term, i.e., permissible inference, and the fact that the
term "presumption" is also used in other senses.
The one distinctive conception of the term "presumption" appears
to be the eighth, i.e., as a procedural device for shifting the burden of
producing evidence. So far as I know there is no other legal symbol
readily applicable to such rules. The term "presumption" is a useful
one in that regard. The temptation to call all other uses of the term
"spurious" may be resisted. Instead it may be said that the eighth
sense is the only one that is significant.

II
In this section the term "presumption" is limited to the eighth
sense, i.e., as a procedural device shifting the burden of producing
evidence. In the first instance, therefore, a presumption operates in
favor of the party with the burden of persuasion as to any particular
operative fact of a case. It benefits him in two particulars: (I) It
saves him from a directed verdict against him;55 (2) it entitles him to
55 Of course, a presumption may not always be necessary for that purpose because the
proponent may have other evidence sufficient to establish an inferential case and thereby
be submitted to the trier of the fact.
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a directed verdict upon that issue in case the opponent fails to introduce
evidence, or another presumption, against the operative fact in issue.
If the opponent does introduce evidence sufficient to warrant a negative
finding upon the operative fact in issue, or is aided by another presumption, there can be no directed verdict against him. Thus far, I
believe, all authorities agree. Professor Thayer took the position that
a presumption had no other effect.56 It follows that once the opponent
has introduced evidence, the presumption has served its purpose and
the case proceeds as though there were no presumption. That view
finds support in the writings of Dean Wigmore57 and in the American
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence.58 •
The Thayer view has, however, been under severe attack from
many quarters. Leader of this attack has been Professor Edmund H.
Morgan of the Harvard Law School.59 Among the more recent of
the articles by the learned professor is one which he wrote in collaboration with Professor John M. Maguire, also of the Harvard Law School,
entitled "Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence."60 The view
is there expressed, "The Thayer-Wigmore view has proved unacceptable because it is both arbitrary and unreasonable. Its unreason consists
in assigning so slight and evanescent procedural effect to every presumption." The critics61 of the Thayer view generally take the position that a presumption cannot be said to have been rebutted except
by evidence credited by the trier of the fact. They, therefore, support
the so-called "Pennsylvania" rule62 to the effect that a presumption
shifts the burden of persuasion. By said rule the effect of a presumption would never be overcome unless the trier of the fact were persuaded
by the rebutting evidence. Adherents to these conflicting views came
to grips over the position to be taken in the Model Code,63 with the
56 THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 339 (1898).
57 9 WxcMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2491 (1940).
58 Rule 704, p. 313. See particularly pages 315 to 317.
59 Professor Morgan's articles have been numerous. Outstanding

among them are
''Further Observations on Presumptions," 16 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 245 (1943); "Presumptions,"
12 WASH. L. Rnv. 255 (1937); "Instructing the Jury Upon Presumption and Burden of
Proof," 47 HARV. L. Rnv. 59 (1933); see "Observations Concerning Presumptions," 44
HARv. L. Rnv. 906 (1931).
60 50 HARv. L. Rnv. 909 at 913 (1938).
61 There are many others besides Professor Morgan. For recent criticisms see particularly Reaugh, ''Presumptions and the Burden of Proof," 36 ILL. L. Rnv. 803 at 819
(1942); and Helman, ''Presumptions," 22 CAN. B. Rnv. 118 (1944).
6 2 Not now followed in Pennsylvania. See Watkins v. Prudential Ins . .Co. of America,
315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934); MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 348 Pa. 558 at
567, 36 A. (2d) 492 (1944).
63 For an interesting satire on the Thayer view, together with extensive quotations
from the proceedings of the American Law Institute showing the conflict of minds, see
Helman, ''Presumptions," 22 CAN. B. Rnv. 118 (1944).
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law professors generally supporting the Pennsylvania view and the
judicial representatives supporting the Thayer position. By a close
vote the Thayer view carried the day, and, as above indicated, was
adopted. Professor Morgan, although not entirely reconciled, is at
least now an apologist for the view finally adopted by the American
Law Institute.64 Thus it appears that the Thayer view has at least
temporarily prevailed. It is believed, however, that a support of that
view is in order.
Let us start by offering a criticism of the opposing view principally
contended for, the "Pennsylvania view." The theory that the effect
of a presumption should be to shift the burden of persuasion is recommended by considerations of simplicity and easy applicability. Notwithstanding, there are the following objections:

(1) It could not be made applicable to all conceptions of presumptions, for example, rules of substantive law and inferences. Thus
the great ambiguity in the term would not be eliminated. This is, of
course, also true of the Thayer theory. The point being made is that
the Pennsylvania rule is of no particular benefit in this regard.
(2) Wholly apart from "presumptions" the law has rules fixing
the burden of persuasion. There is therefore no need to use a presumption for that purpose. It would render the concept an entirely
unnecessary one.
(3) It is generally true and sound that rules fixing the burden
of persuasion are determined by matters of general policy similar to the
policy considerations which determine rules of substantive law. Presumptions are normally based upon inferences and balances of probability, which introduce a foreign element into the problem of placing
the burden of persuasion.
( 4) It is not desirable that the burden of persuasion be subject to
constant shifting from one side of the case to the other. In view of
the possibility of conB.icting presumptions, the exact location of the
burden of persuasion could never be known under the Pennsylvania
view until- all the evidence had been introduced. In that connection,
the Thayer view avoids the troublesome problem of conllictive presumptions.615
(5)
64 See

The supporters of the Pennsylvania theory recognize66 that
Morgan, "Observations on Presumptions," 16 So.

CAL.

L. Rl!v. 245 (1943).

65 MonEL ConE, p. 315.
66 Morgan, ''Further Observations on Presumptions," 16 So.
(1943).

CAL.

L. RBv. 245 at 253
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presumptions are usually based upon natural probabilities.67 They
argue that therefore a presumption should be used to determine the
burden of persuasion because that burden should be favorable to the
party whose case is most strongly supported by probability. That
argument involves the same fallacy as Jeremy Bentham committed.68
It confuses the problem of which party must persuade with the problem
of what proof is necessary for persuasion. There is no point in placing
the burden of persuasion on one party merely because the balance of
probabilities favor the other. If such is the case, the party with the
balance of probabilities in his fav01; has no need of having the burden
of persuasion arbitrarily placed upon his adversary.
(6) The Pennsylvania view would leave the law without any
technique for separating the two burdens. It may be rare that such a
result is sought, but there are probably situations in which general
policy demands that the burden of persuasion be on one side, and yet,
in which it is desirable that the opponent be required to produce evidence. The desirability of being able to separate the two burdens is
shown by Janevesian v. Esa,69 a seduction case. Plaintiff offered no
evidence of her prior chaste character, but, since defendant offered
no evidence of unchastity, the plaintiff, aided by a presumption of
chastity, was entitled to a finding as to that issue, and a general verdict
in her favor was upheld. Suppose there had been evidence on both
sides of the issue of prior chastity. It seems self-evident that the same
legal policy that denies to an unchaste woman a cause of action for
seduction should impose upon her the burden of persuasion upon that
issue. It also seems self-evident that she should not be required to
prove chastity unless the defendant first offers evidence of unchastity.
Both of these two principles could not be realized under the Pennsylvania view.
Much of the objection to the Thayer theory, it is believed, arises
from a misconception as to that view. Critics of that theory contend
that presumptions may disappear too easily upon the introduction of
evidence which, if submitted to the trier of the fact, would be disbelieved. It would follow from that criticism that courts following
the Thayer view might be prone to direct verdicts improperly. For
example, in Pariso v. Towse10 Judge Learned Hand indicated that, if
free to follow his own view of the law, he would have sustained the
67 Holmes' opinion for the Court in Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559 at 561, 38
S.Ct. 209 (1917), is cited on that point.
68 See discussions supra at note 36.
69 274 Mass. 231, 174 N.E. 279 (1931).
10 (2d Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 962.
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trial court's directed verdict. The reaction I have observed in law
students to that remark is, "I am glad he did not regard himself as
free." In that case permission to drive an automobile was presumed
from proof of ownership. Said presumption was rebutted by the
testimony of the owner and her nephew, the driver, both highly interested witnesses. Yet, under the Thayer view, the presumption of
permission would disappear. It does not, however, necessarily or
usually follow that because a presumption has been rebutted, the
court will direct a verdict against the presumed fact. Most of what
follows in this article is devoted to proof of the aforesaid proposition.
In discussing rule 704 of the Model Code, the American Law
Institute71 differentiates two situations: (1) When "the basic fact
has not sufficient value as evidence of the presumed fact to support a
finding" and (2) where "the basic fact has sufficient value as evidence
of the presumed fact to support a finding." Judge Hand's fallacy in
Pariso 11. Towse was his assumption that the case fell into the first
category, whereas, properly considered it should fall into the second.
In fact, the first category would rarely, if ever, exist. Justice Holmes
expresses this thought in his opinion for the Court in Greer 11. United
States72 as follows:
"A presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely
a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience
shows the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice the
truth."
Inferences are so vitally tied to presumptions that the Supreme Court
of the United States has held statutory presumptions unconstitutional
unless attended by logical inferences. The statute involved in Tot 11.
United States73 made it an offense for any person previously convicted
of a crime of violence to possess a pistol acquired in interstate commerce. The act also provided that possession of a pistol established the
presumption that it had been acquired in interstate commerce and
prior to the effective date of the act. This last section was held to be
unconstitutional as creating a presumption when there was no rational
inference.74 Of course, it is not every inference that helps to establish
71Pages 315 and 317.
12245 U.S. 559 at 561, 38 S.Ct. 209 (1917).
73 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943), criticized by Hale, 17 So. CAL. L. RBv. 48
(1943), and in many other law review articles. Although the case may be subject to criticism insofar as it regards an inference as absolutely indispensable to a statutory presumption, it is of value in showing the important connection between the two concepts.
74Accord: Western & Atl. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 49 S.Ct. 445 (1929);
Mobile J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136 (1910); and see
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281 (1934).
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a presumption. In Foltis v. City of New York715 it was held that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur presents merely an inference and not a
presumption and that thus a directed verdict for the plaintiff was not
justified even in the absence of evidence of due care by defendant.
It is not contended that all presumptions involve the element of
a rational inference. It is contended that nearly all presumptions involve that element. Let us proceed by examining some of the presumptions frequently regarded as falling within the American Law
Institute's first category, i.e., presumptions in which the ''basic fact
has not sufficient value as evidence of the presumed fact to support
a finding." It can be shown that many of the presumptions which are
sometimes regarded as free from any basis in logical inference are really
based, at least in part, upon a judgment as to the usual course of
human experience. It must be borne in mind that the evidential value
of an inference, i.e., whether an inference is legitimate or not, depends
upon the balance of probability in its favor. 76 To explicate, if it can
be said that given the basic fact the course of human experience is such
that the presumed fact will probably be true, then "the basic fact has
sufficient value as evidence of the presumed fact to support a finding."
The presumption of course of employment from ownership of a
vehicle is frequently regarded as devoid of any inferential basis.77 There
are two versions of this presumption.78 The broader statement of the
rule is that if a vehicle involved in an accident was not being operated
by the owner, from proof of ownership alone it may be presumed that
the driver was the owner's employee and was acting in the course of
his employment. The more narrow statement of the rule is that proof
of employment must be added to proof of ownership before course of
employment may be presumed. Closely analogous to the presumption
of course of employment is the presumption (found in jurisdictions
which impose upon the owner of a vehicle responsibility for the negligence of any person operating it with his permission) of permission
to operate a vehicle from proof of ownership thereof. 79 It is submitted
75 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E. (2d) 455, 153 A.L.R. 1122, with annotations at p. 1134
(1941).
76 Michael and Adler, "The Trial of an Issue of Fact," 34 CoL. L. REv. 1224, 1462
(1934).
77 Mciver v. Schwartz, 50 R.I. 68, 145 A. 101 (1929); Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777 (1926). Accord: Capello v. Aero Mayflower
Transit Co., 116 Vt. 64, 68 A. (2d) 913 (1949); notes in 30 BosT. Umv. L. REv. 284
(1950), and 1941 W1s. L. REv. 521.
78 Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Service Co., 136 Ore. 1, 297 P. 1050, 74 A.L.R. 944
and annotations (1931).
79 Pariso v. Towse, (2d Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 962.
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that in the case of all of these presumptions logical inference can be
found.
Consider :first the easiest case, the narrower version of the presumption of course of employment. From proof of ownership of a
vehicle, plus proof of agency, course of employment may be presumed.
Although it is known that employees sometimes use their employers'
vehicles for purely private missions, yet, that would constitute a distinct
minority of cases. Such would seem to be common knowledge. The
same reasoning applies to the presumption of permission. It is far
more common for a driver to obtain permission before using the
vehicle of another than it is for the driver to take such a vehicle without
permission.80 It is more difficult to see that the broader version of
the presumption of course of employment is also l:iased upon an inference. From proof of ownership of a vehicle involved in an accident,
it is presumed that the operator was an employee of the owner and
was operating the vehicle in the course of his employment. If the
vehicle were of a business type the case would be clearer, but assume
that it is an ordinary passenger vehicle. Whether such a presumption
involves a rational inference depends, of course, upon the question of
probability. No statistics are available so far as I know. If, past a
given point in the highway, one hundred automobiles are driven by
persons other than the owner, how many are being driven upon
missions for the owner? Here are the possibilities: (1) vehicles being
·driven by thieves; (2) vehicles having been loaned to the driver for
purposes of the driver; (3) vehicles being driven by a member of the
owner's family for his own purposes; and ( 4) vehicles being driven
by someone, member of the family or otherwise, upon a mission for
the owner. The :first possibility would be negligible, the second slight
and the third far more substantial. Yet the third possibility would
not be as striking as it might seem. Operation of a father's vehicle
by one of his children for the child's own purposes would ordinarily
be confined to a limited number of years, i.e., from the time he reaches
the legal age to the time he leaves home. Many family vehicles are
owned jointly by husband and wife. In those instances in which such
is not the case it is not unusual to :6.nd husband and wife with their
-own separate vehicles. In cases in which the wife is driving the
husband's vehicle it is quite likely that she will be driving it upon a
family mission, which would make her either an agent for her husband
or a joint enterpriser. Granted, the probabilities might be fairly even;
but it is believed that in the majority of cases the vehicle would be
so Bridges v◄ Welzien, 231 Iowa 6, 300 N.W. 659 (1941).
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operated for some purpose of the owner. It was so held in Judson 11.
Bee Hive Auto Service Co. 81 The court, in that case, said:
'We think, therefore, that when a person is found in possession of a car and is operating it, it is not an unreasonable deduction that he is the agent of the owner and is using the automobile for the latter's benefit. Experience teaches i:hat when
automobiles are involved in accidents they are ordinarily being
operated by the owner or by someone for whose negligence he will
be responsible."
The presumption of death after seven years unexplained absence
is also referred to as one in which the basic fact will not sustain an
inference of the presumed fact. 82 But any long and unexplained
absence would seem to involve an inference of death. People do not
normally fail to communicate with relatives or friends without reason.
It is granted that if the exact date of death becomes material, there is
no reason to infer that death occurred on the last day of the sixth year
of absence. But the seven year provision may well be construed as
a limiting provision rather than a provision specifying the exact time
of death. Some time would naturally have to elapse before a reasonable inference of death could be indulged. Any specified number of
years, including seven, is arbitrary. But the seven year limitation
does not seem to be the real essence of the presumption. It is rather
a necessary, although arbitrary, limitation.
There are some presumptions that are said to depend upon the
superior facilities of the opponent for producing evidence. Examples
of such presumptions are the "no eyewitness" presumption,83 and the
presumption that a holder of a negotiable instrument had notice that
it was obtained by fraud. 84 The former arises in an action for death
by wrongful act, in which there are no witnesses available for the
plaintiff. It is usually presumed that the deceased was free from contributory negligence. It has been said that this presuµiption is based
upon the natural tendency toward self-preservation.811 But that view
has been properly criticized on the ground that said instinct would be
operative whether there are eyewitnesses or not.86 It would seem that
136 Ore. 1 at 8, 297 P. 1050, 74 A.L.R. 944 and annotations (1931).
Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934).
83Wolf v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 347 Mo. 622, 148 S.W. (2d) 1032 (1941);
Seiler v. Whiting, 52 Ariz. 542, 84 P. (2d) 452 (1938); 6 UNIV. DETROIT L.J. 96 (1943).
84 See Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777 (1926).
85 6 UNIV. DETROIT L.J. 96 (1943).
86 Wolf v. New York C. & St. L. R. Co., 347 Mo. 622, 148 S.W. (2d) 1032 (1941).
This case said that the presumption is based upon the necessities of the situation. Why?
It is difficult to follow the court. The idea of a presumption being predicated upon necessity is discussed infra.
81

8 2 See
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the presumption, like some other presumptions, is based upon the
greater facility of the opponent for producing evidence. Such presumption may be regarded as similar in purpose to modern discovery
devices, and therefore to involve no element of inference. Yet it is
submitted that an inferential basis can be shown.
If the proponent does not have the benefit of an existing inference
he is at least favored by a potential inference. This potential inference
is based upon the inference which arises when a party fails to call
witnesses or introduce other evidence within his power to call or introduce. 87 The withholding of evidence which a party is capable of producing is a type of spoliation. The inference is that the reason the
evidence was not used was that it would have been adverse to the
offering party had it been introduced. Inferences from this type of
spoliation have been held to be drastic. 88
In a situation in which the opponent has a decidedly superior
means of producing evidence, the proponent is not entitled to an actual
inference until the opponent has had the opportunity to produce evidence and has failed to do so. Since the proponent is called upon to
produce evidence first, such an actual inference would not benefit the
proponent in the first instance. But does not the law give the proponent, in this situation, the benefit of a potential inference, which will
develop into an actual inference if the opponent eventually fails to
offer the evidence he has the power to produce? If such evidence is
produced, the potential inference is never actualized. In that way it
can be said that any presumption based upon the superior capacity of
the opponent to produce evidence is still based upon an inference at
least potential.
The statutory presumptions offer no exception to the analysis here
presented. They too may be analyzed as based upon inferences, i.e.,
upon the balance of probabilities. The probability of the existence of
87Donald v. Swann, 24 Ala. App. 463, 137 S. 178 (1931), cert. den. 223 Ala. 493,
137 S. 181; 34 CoRN. L.Q. 637 (1949); 33 MINN. L. REv. 423 (1949).
88 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lawnsdail, 235 Iowa 125, 15 N.W. (2d) 880
(1944). Suit was by an insurance company to cancel an insurance policy with a cross
bill for relief on the policy. The issue was whether the policy had been obtained by
misrepresentation. Statements were made in the application which were without doubt
untrue. Plaintiff insurance company contended that those false answers had been written
by the insured. Defendant beneficiary contended that the insured had given correct
answers to plaintiff's agent who wrote them down wrong. There was evidence that plaintiff
had destroyed certain of its records which might have included entries confirming defendant's version of what occurred when the application was executed. The trial court found
the issues for plaintiff but that finding was reversed by the supreme court which directed
entry of a judgment for defendant. The action was based upon the inference resulting
from spoliation.
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a fact can never be known with certitude. It can only be approximated.
The function of making such an approximation may fall to the court,
the jury, or the legislature. In the usual case, the court makes the
determination itself if the evidence is so clear that reasonable minds
cannot differ; otherwise the determination is left to the jury. A statutory presumption89 may be regarded as representing a legislative determination as to what inferences are permissible from a specified basic
fact. The legitimacy of an inference is determined by reference to the
usual human experience, with which members of a legislature should ~
be as familiar as courts or jurors. Of course, the United States Supreme
Court has held in Tot v. United States90 that the legislature cannot
create a presumption wholly divorced from an inference. The opinion
in the Tot case brings out, however, at least by implication, that the
power of the legislature to create a statutory presumption is not limited
to those presumptions which have been judicially found to exist. It is
clearly inferable that there is a permissible legislative margin between
those presumptions which are judicially declared and those so lacking
in· any inferential basis as to be beyond the scope of legislative
determination.
The preceding analysis should provide a solution for the problems
of the disappearance of presumptions and of directed verdicts. It is
submitted that all presumptions always disappear when sufficient evidence is introduced by the opponent to justify a :finding against the
presumption. That would follow from the very concept of the presumption, that of a procedural device requiring the production of
evidence by the opponent. Once evidence is produced, the presumption has served its procedural purpose and is of no more utility in the
case. It does not follow that the removal of a presumption by the
introduction of evidence will necessitate a directed verdict against the
proponent. The reason is that, although the presumption may disappear when rebutting evidence is introduced, the inference connected
therewith may remain. 91 That inference will be weighed by the trier
of the fact against the rebutting evidence.
The foregoing discussion has been predicated upon the premise
89 As differentiated from a statutory prima facie case, sometimes called a presumption,
discussed supra. The difference is that the court, in case of a true statutory presumption,
will direct a verdict on the operative fact in issue if the opponent offers no rebutting
evidence, whereas a statutory prima facie case only entitles the proponent to have his case
submitted to the jury.
90 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943).
919 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2491 (1940). Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777 (1926); Stumpf v. Montgomery, 101 Okla. 257, 226
P. 65 (1924); see Barstow v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 259 Mich. 125, 242 N.W. 862 (1932).
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that all, or practically all, presumptions are associated with permissible
inferences. Two questions must here be faced: (1) Can the aforesaid
premise be substantiated? (2) If there are presumptions which involve
no element of inference,92 what will be the effect upon the analysis
heretofore made? To answer the first question an inquiry must be made
as to why presumptions exist, i.e., why is the burden of producing
evidence, at the risk of suffering an adverse directed verdict for failure,
ever imposed upon the party who does not have the burden of
persuasion?
Several reasons have been given for the existence of presumptions.93
Although various sources do not enumerate them the same, the classifications given may be synthesized as follows: 94

I. Social policy.
2. Balance of ability to obtain evidence.
3. Necessity, sometimes referred to as a matter of procedural
expediency or procedural convenience.
4. Balance of probability.
Since it is the contention of this paper that there is little, if any, need
for presumptions based upon other than the fourth enumerated ground,
each of the grounds should be considered.
The first of the mentioned grounds is very general and could include all the others. It is true that policy considerations do and should
affect the problem of judicial proof. But it seems that such an effect
should be expressed by carefully locating the burden of persuasion
rather than through the burden of producing evidence. As pointed out
above, the problem of determining upon what party the burden of
persuasion should be located must be kept distinct from the problem
of determining whether that burden has been fulfilled. The first of
these problems is answered by reference to considerations of social
92 The

number I situation as presented by the American Law Institute, MoDEL CoDB

315.
93 See Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934); Wolf v.
New York C. & St. L. R. Co., 347 Mo. 622, 148 S.W. (2d) 1032 (1941); Helman,
"Presumptions,'' 22 CAN. B. RBv. 118 (1944), discussing the debate by the American
Law Institute and quoting from Professor Edmund H. Morgan at pp. 124, 125.
94 Professors Morgan and Maguire enumerate seven reasons for presumptions in their
casebook on Evidence, 3d ed., p. 77 (1951). The seventh is merely a combination of
two or more of the other six. The first three are really different versions of variations of
procedural necessity or convenience. It is said that some presumptions, for example the
presumption of sanity, exist as a matter of convenience in excusing proof of facts which
usually are not seriously contested. But it can well be argued that this is merely a result
of the presumption, and that it is based upon the fact that most people are sane and that
therefore the probabilities are that any particular person is sane.
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policy; the answer to the second depends upon a balance of probabilities.
The second of the above-mentioned grounds for presumptions was
relied upon by the prosecution in Tot 11. United States. 95 The Supreme
Court of the United States held, nevertheless, that such a balance of
convenience in producing evidence is not enough, standing alone, to
create a presumption. There must be a basis in logic inference, at least
permissive. A permissive inference alone would be sufficient to justify
a verdict for the proponent, but not sufficient to require one. The
opponent's failure to produce evidence when he has the ability to do
so may justify a directed verdict for the proponent.
The Tot case merely passed upon the constitutionality of a statutory presumption. It cannot be regarded as holding that a judiciallycreated presumption cannot be based upon the greater facility for producing evidence. But why should it? Normally, law suits should not
be instituted unless the prosecuting party can obtain evidence upon all
operative facts upon which he has the burden of persuasion. As a
discovery method such a basis for a presumption may find support,
especially as viewed historically. The opponent who has means of
information would be forced to take the stand and subject himself to
cross-examination. The sanction for compelling him to do so is the
threat of a directed verdict against him if he fails. Such justification
for a presumption may still exist, but its force is less striking in the
light of modern types of discovery, including the power to call one's
opponent and subject him to cross-examination. It would seem that
the principal justification for such a presumption is the inference that
if a party fails to produce evidence which is within his power to produce, the evidence would be against him if it were produced. Thus,
it would seem that the second of the enumerated grounds for presumptions is based upon an inference or at least a potential inference. 96
Professor Morgan has indicated that in some presumptions the basic
fact may form the basis of a logical inference, but one insufficient to
support a verdict.97 The potential inference arising from the fact that
95 319

U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943).
same question has been discussed supra where various presumptions, such as
the "no eyewitness" presumption, were discussed, and it has been shown that said presumptions may be explained as based upon potential inferences.
97 "Further Observations on Presumptions," 16 So. CAL. L. R:sv. 245 (1943). In
that article, presumptions are classified in three categories: (1) cases in which the basic
fact has no logical connection with the presumed fact, (2) cases in which the basic fact has
some value as evidence of the presumed fact, but not sufficient to support a verdict, and
(3) cases in which the basic fact is such strong evidence 0£ the presumed fact that, in the
absence of other evidence, a failure to find the presumed fact would be arbitrary.
96 This
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the opponent may fail to produce evidence within his power to produce
is not insufficient. It is analogous to the inference which arises from
spoliation. Such an inference has been held to have compelling force. 98
For such a presumption to disappear when rebutting evidence is introduced means no more than the fact that the potential inference has
failed to ripen into an actual inference.
The third of the bases for presumptions is said to be necessity. That
implies that there are fact issues which cannot be decided without indulging in a presumption. Why would such issues exist? The burden
of persuasion must be located somewhere. If it is impossible for either
side to produce evidence, the result would normally be easy-the party
with the burden of persuasion loses. Thus, it might seem that there
would never be a necessity of arbitrarily creating a presumption.
If necessity may be the basis for a presumption it would certainly
seem that there would be a presumption regarding the sequence of
death when two parties die in a common catastrophe. Not all American
authority recognizes such a presumption. 99 It has been considered that
rules establishing the burden of persuasion as to particular issues are
sufficient for procedural purposes.100 If an impasse exists in which
there is no evidence either pro or con upon some material issue, the
ready solution is to :find against the party who has the burden of persuasion. It may be objected that if the decision of a case depends upon
the burden of persuasion, justice will not be sufficiently even, because
the location of that burden may depend upon the procedural accident
of how an issue happens to arise in a particular case.101 However, the
location of the burden of persuasion should be, and I believe usually
is, determined from policy considerations.
It would seem from the analysis heretofore presented that all presumptions involve logical inferences and such may well be the case.
Yet, it is not desired to make such an assertion dogmatically. Certainly
many courts recognize presumptions which they believe have no basis
in the usual experience of mankind. So far as I have been able to
discover, those presumptions can be logically explained, but there are
other presumptions, sometimes recognized, which cannot be so ex98 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lawnsclail, 235 Iowa 125, 15 N.W. (2d) 880
(1944). In a case in which the evidence was otherwise conflicting, destruction of evidence
by the plaintiff was held to be sufficient to justify setting aside a finding for the plaintiff
and entering one for the defendant.
99 MonGAN AND MA.ct!IRE, CASBS AND MATBRIALS ON EvmBNCB, 3d ed., 77, 78 (1951).
100 Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448 (1925).
101 Cf. Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, (8th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 234, cert. den.
311 U.S. 699, 61 S.Ct. 391 (1940).
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plained. As pointed out above, a presumption of death after seven
years absence can be regarded as based upon natural inference. But
obviously there is no reason to infer that death occurred at any particular time during the seven years, e.g., on the 365th day of the sixth
year. In jurisdictions in which such a presumption is recognized it
must be conceded that we have a presumption in which the basic fact
is insufficient to support a conclusion that the presumed fact exists.
If, in some jurisdictions, presumptions are found which have no
basis in logical inference, they, like all others, disappear once evidence
is introduced. Although that result would necessitate a directed verdict
against the proponent, it is difficult to see any objection to such action.
It is said that a presumption should not be regarded as having been
rebutted except by evidence believed by either the court:1° 2 or the trier
of the fact. 103 But why? It is easy to see why, if the presumption is
based upon inference; on the other hand, if there is no logical inference,
the verdict would be directed, not because the rebutting evidence is
credited but because evidence is lacking on behalf of the proponent.
The only value such a presumption could have would be to give a basis
for deciding the case in the absence of any evidence whatever. 104 That
value would seem to be gone once actual evidence is introduced. It
may be that the proponent finds it difficult to obtain evidence, but the
law has never given cause of action to a party without evidence merely
because the obtaining of evidence is difficult or impossible.
The foregoing contentions may be summarized by the following
propositions: (1) almost all presumptions include permissible inferences; (2) under the Thayer view all presumptions become inoperative
with the introduction of rebutting evidence; (3) nevertheless, the inferences involved in said presumptions remain, and may present evidence sufficient to be evaluated by the trier of the fact, even though
rebutting evidence has come forth. The question then arises, how,
except in that rare minority of "non-inference'' presumptions, can there
ever be a directed verdict against a proponent who has the benefit of
a presumption. Yet we know that directed verdicts do occur, and prop102 Chailra v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169
103 Helman, ''Presumptions," 22 CAN. B. fuv.

N.E. 103 (1929).
118 (1944). At p. 124 reference is
made to the debate by the American Law Institute. Professor Morgan is cited as taking
the position indicated.
104 This is not the situation in which a presumption is used as a discovery device.
That situation contemplates superior knowledge on the part of the opponent. It has been
shown above that a presumption predicated upon superior knowledge on the part of the
opponent really involves an inference, at least potentially. Here, the hypothesis is that
there is no actual knowledge and that neither side has better means of knowledge than the
other.
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erly occur in many cases. The view here presented must be able to
account for that fact. Does the theory here expounded, in order to
save the judicial voyager from the rock of Scylla throw him upon the
bank of Charybdis? Has this theory proved too much? Has it followed
from the attempt to show that the Thayer view does not require directed
verdicts in a large portion of cases105 in which presumptions have been
met with rebutting evidence that directed verdicts could rarely if ever
be given, even in what might otherwise appear to be appropriate cases?
It is submitted that such is not the case. In order to assert that directed
verdicts may still be readily available, it is necessary to maintain another
proposition, one which, so far as I know, has never been formulated.
The proposition is that although an inference attending a presumption
may survive the evidence rebutting the presumption, the inference
itself may be eliminated by sufficiently cogent rebutting evidence, thus
making a directed verdict possible. If this is true, many cases which
otherwise cannot be explained become intelligible, and many attempts
at elaborate classification of presumptions become unnecessary.
The basic premise may be regarded as a heresy. It is that the court
in directing a verdict is compelled to weigh evidence. An inference
standing alone may be sufficient to carry a case to the jury but be so
outweighed in the presence of rebutting evidence that a directed verdict is indicated. It is an orthodoxy that courts do not weigh evidence
in deciding motions for directed verdicts. That proposition is particularly true when the weighing of evidence requires an estimation as to
the relative credibility of witnesses. The function of evaluation is less
exclusively the jury's, however, when weighing of evidence depends
upon the strength of inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence.106 The difference would seem to be that there is such a strong
inference that a witness, even though impeached, is telling the truth,
that if there is testimonial evidence on both sides of a question it could
rarely, if ever, be said that the weight of the evidence was manifestly
on one side. But inferences from circumstantial evidence vary greatly
in persuasive effect.
105 Those cases represented by the American Law Institute's first category (MonEL
Com;:, p. 315) i.e., cases in which "the basic fact has not sufficient value as evidence to
support a finding and there is no other evidence that the presumed fact exists." The position here taken is that the twofold classification in the Model Code is correct but that
almost all presumption cases fall into the second category, i.e., cases in which "the basic
fact has sufficient value as evidence of the presumed fact to support a finding."
105 In Dent v. Foy, 214 Ala. 243 at 250, 107 S. 210 (1925), the court uses the
following language: "Neither the verdict of a jury nor the finding of the register, given the
same effect, is to be accorded that conclusive character which obtains when the finding is
upon disputed facts depending upon the veracity of witnesses rather than a matter of judgment arrived at from opinion evidence aided by their own."
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Courts have had difficulty in determining when a presumption
disappears and when it does not, and they have attempted to answer
the problem by classifying presumptions. The result of most of the
cases can be rationalized by realizing that the problem is not one of
determining when presumptions disappear, but of determining when
evidence is sufficient to overbalance inferences so completely as to authorize directed verdicts. The problem of presumptions then becomes
one aspect of the more general problem of directing verdicts. It is
sound to regard the presumption as disappearing with the introduction
of rebutting evidence leaving the case to stand as though there had
never been a presumption. In such a state of affairs the court must
decide whether to determine the issue itself or submit it to the jury.
The most satisfactory test for directing verdicts is the "reasonable
minds" test.107 If reasonable minds cannot differ as to a particular
operative fact, only a question of law is presented and the court must
direct a finding as to that issue. If, on the other hand, reasonable minds
can differ, the question must be presented to the trier of the fact. 108
The presumption having disappeared with the introduction of rebutting evidence, the question of a proponent's being entitled to have
a case which is based upon the surviving inference submitted to the
jury therefore depends upon whether or not in view of the nature of
rebutting evidence it can be said that reasonable minds would differ
or agree. It is submitted that most of the cases can be explained upon
that basis. The case of Judson 11. Bee Hive Auto Service Co. is persuasive.109 The presumption of agency and course of employment
from ownership of a vehicle was there involved. The court specifically regarded said presumption as based upon a logical inference. In
rebuttal the defendant introduced evidence to the effect that it operated a "drive urself" business, and that, at the time of the accident, the
operator was a bailee for hire. The written contract showing the rental
of the vehicle was placed in evidence. In holding that the trial court
should have directed a verdict for the defendant the court said:
"Ordinarily, whether an inference or presumption has been
107 It is sometimes said that the evidence must be considered in its aspect most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is to be directed. But that qualification principally means that in case oE conffict between the testimony oE witnesses, the court, in
determining whether or not to direct, must consider only the testimony favorable to the
party against whom the verdict would be directed, i£ at all. The reason for that may well
be said to be that issues oE credibility are always sufficiently doubtEul that it cannot be said
that all reasonable minds would agree.
10s Michael and Adler, "The Trial oE an Issue oE Fact," 34 CoL. L. R:sv. 1224, 1462
at 1488 (1934).
109136 Ore. 1 at 14, 297 P. 1050 (1931).
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overcome is a question for the jury, but if the evidence is of such
character, that but one reasonable deduction can be made therefrom, the court may so declare as a matter of law. It is entirely
reasonable that an inference may be drawn during one stage of the
trial and a different one at a later time, after all the evidence is in
the record. At the close of plaintiff's case in chief, it might have
been reasonable, in view of proof of defendant's ownership of the
automobile, to infer that Mills was driving the same for the owner's benefit; but would such inference still obtain after it had been
shown by clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence that Mills
had rented the automobile from defendant, and was driving it for
. own pleasure."
h1s
It has generally been considered that in the State of Ohio the jury
determines whether or not the persuasive effect of a presumption has
been equally balanced by rebutting evidence.110 But in the recent
Ohio case of Brunny 11. Prudential Insurance Company of America'-11
it was held that the rebutting evidence may be of sufficient cogency
to authorize a directed verdict. The plaintiff in that case sued upon an
insurance policy, contending that her husband, whose life had been
insured, was dead because more than seven years elapsed since she
last heard of him. The defendant offered cogent evidence, including
a recent picture of the husband and his deposition, that the husband
was still alive. In holding that the trial court should have directed a
verdict for the defendant the court reaffirmed the usual "Ohio" rule,
that a presumption remains until met by evidence which exactly equals
it in persuasive force, and then said:
"A court should not invade the province of the jury, but in a
case like the present one, where upon all the evidence adduced,
reasonable minds could not fairly conclude that the presumption
should stand, it disappears, and if in addition to such presumption,
there is no evidence tending to show that the absentee is in fact
dead, the duty devolves upon the trial court to direct a verdict or
to render judgment for the defendant upon his motion therefor."
The result reached by the Ohio court shows the applicability of the
analysis here suggested. Unfortunately, the court talked about reasonable minds being unable to conclude fairly that the presumption could
stand. Under the Thayer view the presumption would disappear with
the introduction of any evidence, but the inference attending the pre110 Tresise v. Ashdown, ll8 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898 (1928); Klunk v. Hocking
Valley Railway Company, 74 Ohio St. 125, 77 N.E. 752 (1906).
111151 Ohio St. 86 at 94, 84 N.E. (2d) 504 (1949).

226

MrcmGAN LAw R.Bvmw

[ Vol. 52

sumption could not stand if the rebutting evidence was so persuasive
that reasonable minds could not differ. As explained above, the results
of cases can be reconciled more easily than their reasoning techniques.
Although there are many different views as to the rebuttal of presumptions, cases can generally be explained by the theory here announced.112
112 Reference will be made to only a few cases. The court in Ezzard v. United States,
(8th Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 808 at 812, noted in 10 Mnm. L. B.Bv. 542 (1926), was
confronted by the statutory presumption that possession of narcotics created a preswnption
of illegal dealing therein. Defendant was arrested with a trunk containing narcotics in his
possession. He proved (by his own testimony, so far as the court's opinion reveals) that
he had no knowledge of the content of the trunk, and was hauling it as an accommodation
for someone else. Apparently defendant was a respected member of the community, and
his insistence that he was an innocent bystander was unimpeached. The court talks about
inferences and preswnptions interchangeably, and in holding that the trial court should
have directed a verdict said: "It may be conceded that the strength or weight of presumptions is for the jury, but it is obvious that the law attaches to them slight consideration in
the face of credible testimony leading to a contrary conclusion." The controlling issue in
Beggs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 24, 257 N.W. 445 (1934), was whether
a life insurance policy had been effectively delivered to the insured before his death. A
presumption of delivery arose from its possession by the insured. The defendant insurance
company introduced the testimony of its agent to the effect that the policy had been given
insured for purposes of inspection only and that the first premium had not been paid as
required for the policy's effectiveness. The court regarded the presumption of effective
delivery as based upon the usual experience of mankind that policies are not delivered for
inspection only without a receipt being taken. The court held that the question was properly submitted to the jury, while indicating that the presumption (meaning inference)
would have disappeared if conclusive evidence had been presented against it. See also
Veihelmann v. Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co., 99 N.Y.S. (2d) 727 (1950), noted in 64
HAnv. L. B.Bv. 998 (1951); Collins v. Streitz, (9th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 430.
It is interesting to note how the modem cases of a single jurisdiction can be explained
according to the analysis here advanced. The West Virginia courts have talked about many
categories of presumptions: presumptions of fact, presumptions of law, legal presumptions,
prima facie presumptions, rebuttable presumptions, etc. One searches in vain through the
cases for an exact meaning of the different categories, and to determine whether there are
that many different types or whether some of the terms used are different symbols for
the same concept. Yet, the cases seem to be subject to quite a logical analysis so far as
their factual situations are concerned. A United States circuit court of appeals had occasion
in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Blodgett, (4th Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 273, to interpret §48-8-1
of the West Virginia code providing for a presumption of death after seven years unexplained absence. The court stated that when rebutting evidence was introduced the presumption disappeared but that there was also an inference of death which remained.
Similar language was used by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Weismantle v. Petros, 124 W.Va. 180, 19 S.E. (2d) 594 (1942). In that case the presumption
of agency and course of employment from proof of ownership of a vehicle was involved.
The owner and operator of the vehicle were brothers. Their father was in the hospital and
their mother was visiting him. The operator brother took the vehicle to bring her home
and was driving when the accident occurred. Both brothers testified that the operator
brother took the vehicle on his own to bring the mother home. However, it was held that
such testimony was not enough to create a sufficiently clear case of no agency to authorize
a directed verdict for the owner brother, the defendant. The operator brother had been
impeached by prior contradictory statements. The court talked about the presumption not
disappearing unless credible evidence was introduced in rebuttal, but, obviously the testimony of the two brothers was sufficiently credible to prevent a directed verdict for the
plaintiff on that issue. The court really meant that the inference of agency and scope of
employment was not clearly overcome by such testimony. The issue in Antonowich v.
Home Ins. Co., 116 W.Va. 155, 179 S.E. 601 (1935), was whether notice of loss had
been given in time not to forfeit the right of recovery under an insurance policy. Appar-
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The argument here presented may seem to be similar in result to
the theory, underlying certain New York decisions, that a presumption
is not so completely rebutted as to authorize a directed verdict for the
opponent unless "substantial" evidence is introduced against it.113 It
ently receipt of the notice was necessary. Plaintiff testified to the mailing and relied upon
the presumption that a letter properly stamped, addressed and mailed is received. The
chief of defendant's loss section testified that no such letter appeared in the file of the
assured. It was held that such testimony was not enough to authorize a directed verdict
for the defendant. It was indicated, however, that if the employee who receives the mail
could testify that no such letter had been received, such testimony would have been
sufficient. The aforementioned cases held that there were still questions for the jury not•
withstanding the introduction of rebutting evidence. There are also cases which hold that
directed verdicts are indicated. The case of Lambert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 123
W.Va. 547, 17 S.E. (2d) 628 (1941), involved the presumption that a violent death is
accidental. Suit was upon a policy insuring against death by accident. Assured, a bank
teller, was short in his accounts. When a bank examiner arrived unexpectedly, assured
excused himself to go home for a few minutes. Shortly after his arrival at home a gunshot
was heard and he was found dead. It was held that there should have been a directed
verdict for the defendant because the presumption could not stand against the strong
evidence of suicide. Actually, what the court's decision comes to is that reasonable minds
cannot but conclude that the inference of suicide from the circumstances proved outweighs
the inference of accidental death from the basic fact of violent death. The same presumption was involved in Beckley Bank v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 121 W.Va. 152, 2 S.E. (2d)
256 (1939). It was there held that the presumption of accident could not stand against
the positive testimony of decedent's wife that she shot him. In Mullens v. Frazer, 134
W.Va. 409, 59 S.E. (2d) 694 (1950), suit was filed to set aside an alleged fraudulent
conveyance. That the conveyance was in fraud of creditors was undisputed. That the
grantee paid actual value was also undisputed. Whether or not the conveyance could be
set aside against the grantee therefore depended upon whether he had actual notice of the
fraud. The grantee was a brother-in-law of the grantor. From this evidence there was a
presumption of guilty knowledge. However, the evidence also showed that the grantee lived
a long distance from the grantor, gave up a good situation to move because of his health,
and spent a considerable sum to improve the premises conveyed. From all of this it was
held that the trial court was compelled to conclude that there was no actual knowledge on
the part of the grantee. These cases show the confusion resulting from talking about what
evidence is necessary to eliminate a presumption from a case. How much better to say that
any evidence eliminates the presumption, and that, when eliminated, the court is merely
presented with a standard problem of whether or not to direct a verdict.
The same situation would seem to exist today in Pennsylvania. After having long
supported the view that a presumption shifts the burden of persuasion, the court seems to
have adopted the Thayer view. In MacDonald v. Pennsylvauia R. Co., 348 Pa. 558 at
567, 36 A. (2d) 492 (1944), the court uses strictly orthodox Thayer language and quotes
from Thayer's PRELIMINARY TREATISE at page 339. Yet, in Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa.
577, 188 A. 350 (1936), the court, recognizing the same general rule, clearly implies that
the court will not withdraw a case from the jury unless rebutted by evidence which for
some reason the court considers to be more persuasive than the presumption. There, a
presumption of operation of a vehicle from proof that the license plates on this vehicle
involved in the accident had been issued to defendant was rebutted by proof that defendant's plates had been stolen and used on another vehicle. The court stated that if such
rebutting evidence had come from the defendant or his witnesses, the case would not have
been withdrawn from the jury, but since it came from the plaintiff's own witnesses a directed
verdict would be authorized.
11s Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101 at 104, 169 N.E. 103 (1929); Pariso v.
Towse, (2d Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 962, applying New York law. Compare St. Andrassy
v. Mooney, 262 N.Y. 368, 186 N.E. 867 (1933), which follows the analysis presented in
this article.

228

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 52

is evident that the "substantial" evidence required by the New York
courts is something more than what would be sufficient to sustain a
verdict against the presumed fact. Evidence from one of the plaintiff's
own witnesses114 and evidence from a disinterested witness115 have
been held to be substantial and therefore sufficient to justify directed
· verdicts against the presumed facts. The method of analysis used by
the New York courts involves a glaring ambiguity. It uses the term
"rebut'' in two senses. It is evident that one standard of evidence
against the presumed fact is sufficient to rebut the presumption in the
sense of preventing a directed verdict for the proponent, but that a
higher standard is necessary to rebut the presumption in the sense of
authorizing a directed verdict for the opponent. The Thayer view, as
here analyzed, limits the concept of rebuttal to the first of the two
meanings, i.e., a presumption is rebutted when sufficient evidence is
introduced to prevent a directed verdict for the proponent. The case
is then regarded as though there were no presumptions. Unless the
evidence against the inference is sufficiently strong that reasonable
minds could not differ, the case will go to the jury with the inference
which remains after the presumption is rebutted. The concept of "substantial" evidence, as used by the New York courts, is the same as the
concept of that amount of evidence which will be sufficiently strong
that reasonable minds cannot differ in concluding against the proponent. Thus, the analysis of the Thayer view here given renders it
consistent in result with the New York view.
It is also consistent with the practice followed by the Ohio courts.
Those courts say that the presumption must be met by evidence sufficient to balance it in persuasive force. That is equivalent to saying the
presumption is eliminated and the inference will permit a finding for
the opponent unless balanced by evidence. Since reasonable minds
generally differ on that question it will usually be decided by the jury.
It has, however, been shown above that said question might be decided
by the court.116 In fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently said117
that "substantial" evidence against a presumption will eliminate it and
bring about a directed verdict for the opponent. It is thus indicated that
the "substantial" evidence of the New York courts is the same as the
evidence ·necessary to balance a presumption of the Ohio courts and
114Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 N.E. 78 (1917).
115 Der Ohannessian v. Elliott, 233 N.Y. 326, 135 N.E. 518 (1922).
116 Brunny v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 151 Ohio St. 86, 84

N.E. (2d) 504
(1949).
111 Shepherd v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E. (2d) 156
(1949).
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the same reasoning makes both views consistent in result with the
Thayer theory.
The objection has been made to the substantial evidence rule of
the New York courts that it involves too much of an element of judgment on the part of the court in determining whether evidence offered
against a presumption is substantial or not. 118 But that type of problem
of judgment cannot be avoided in any case, nor should it be. Judges,
not being automatons, are supposed to exercise judgment. The position
here taken is that the problem of passing upon motions for directed
verdicts in cases involving presumptions is no different from the problem of ruling upon such motions generally. If the reasonable minds
test is used a problem of judgment will be involved in every case.
Under the view that a presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to
the opponent, problems of judgment will not be eliminated unless the
position is taken that there can never be a directed verdict for the
opponent. Otherwise, the court will be called upon to decide whether
the opponent has met the presumption with evidence so conclusive as
to entitle him to a directed verdict.
Admittedly there are situations in which some courts hold that a
presumption, unsupported by other evidence, disappears upon the introduction of any testimonial evidence against the presumed fact, even
though it came entirely from the opponent himself or from other
interested witnesses. This situation causes no embarrassment since it
can be explained in three ways: (1) The presumption disappears with
the introduction of any rebutting evidence, leaving to the court the
function of weighing the inference against the rebutting evidence. But
a strong inference always exists in favor of testimonial evidence. An
inference is merely a rule of probability. But improbable things frequently do happen. The probability in favor of the truth of testimony
is such that courts may conclude that reasonable minds cannot weigh
an inference against such testimony.119 That might be true even
though testimony comes from a party or other interested witness. All
witnesses take an oath, are subject to the sanction of perjury prosecution, and are subject to cross examination. The Thayer theory, as here
analyzed, does not require a directed verdict on such testimony. Most
courts which purportedly follow that theory likely would not grant such
a motion. The question is one of judicial judgment. (2) In many
118 Morgan, "Further Observations on Presumptions," 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 245 at
254 (1943).
119 This is not :inevitably true even as regards testimony from unimpeached witnesses.
Andrew Jergens Co. v. Conner, (6th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 686.
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cases in which rebutting evidence by interested witnesses has been
held to authorize directed verdicts the presumption involved was based
upon the greater facility of the opponent for the obtaining of evidence.
That type of presumption has been analyzed above as involving a
potential inference which becomes an actual inference when evidence
is not produced. If the opponent produces such evidence as he can,
the basis for any inference is gone and the proponent fails because of
his lack of evidence. It would seem to be axiomatic that parties who
would prosecute law suits must produce evidence. It is difficult to think
of a legal policy which would treat ignorance as the equivalent of proof.
(3) Some courts may regard some presumptions as in no wise involving
any logical inference. Such presumptions could exist only as a means
of giving a basis for decision when no evidence is available. In such
a situation it would seem that any evidence, however weak, would
furnish the only basis upon which a case could be decided.
In conclusion let it be said that no contention is made that the
analysis here exposed is generally followed, even by courts purporting
to follow the Thayer view. The writer believes that some misconceptions regarding the Thayer theory have caused unnecessary opposition
to that position. The cases are in hopeless confusion so far as reasoning
techniques are concerned. The analysis here advanced will serve to
reconcile many of the results reached if not the reasoning by which
they have been reached. Basically the views here presented follow
Thayer strictly. Most of the points here made have been presented by
that learned author and by others. Since detailed familiarity with the
extensive writing on this subject would be impossible it may be that
no idea has been initially presented. The following thoughts which
have been developed, however, were spontaneous with the writer: (I)
the full realization of the purport and accuracy of Justice Holmes'
dicta in Greer v. United States1 20 to the effect that all presumptions
are based upon probability, i.e., inference, (2) the realization that it
is the inference and not the presumption that the court weighs against
rebutting evidence, and (3) the realization that the problem as to the
effect of presumptions is one phase of the broader problem of directing
verdicts.
If it has any other effect than to impose the burden of producing
evidence upon the party who does not have the burden of persuasion,
the concept of a presumption confuses rather than facilitates the analysis of specific fact issues.
120 245

U.S. 559 at 561, 38 S.Ct. 209 (1918).

